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Abstract: Labour standards provisions within the Trade and Sustainable
Development (TSD) chapters of EU Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are presented
as a key element of the EU’s commitment to a ‘value-based trade agenda’. But
criticism of TSD chapters has led the European Commission to commit to
improving their implementation and enforcement, creating a critical juncture in
the evolution of the EU’s trade–labour linkage. This contribution synthesizes
ﬁndings from academic studies that have examined the effectiveness of labour
standards provisions in EU FTAs. It then considers the reform agenda as presented
by the European Commission, and explains how some of the proposals could
tackle failures identiﬁed. However, it also argues that there are various limitations
with the Commission’s current proposals, and outlines how legal obligations and
institutional mechanisms created by trade agreements could better be harnessed to
improve working conditions and rights at work around the world.
1. Introduction
Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) chapters have been a standard compo-
nent of the EU’s Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) since the initial signing of the
EU–South Korea FTA in 2009. TSD chapters, and the labour standards provisions
contained within them, have been a critical part of the European Commission’s
commitment to a ‘value-based trade agenda’.1 In its strategic plan for 2016–
2020, DG Trade recognizes that trade policy has come under increased public scru-
tiny and that part of the response to this must be to promote ‘sustainable economic,
social and environmental conditions’ in the EU and trade partner countries,
including through the use of ‘strong provisions to promote the respect of labour
rights’.2 But those labour provisions have themselves come in for criticism,
particularly from trade unions, civil society organizations, and the European
1 European Commission, Trade for All (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities), 2015,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf (accessed 9 October 2017).
2 European Commission, Strategic Plan 2016−2020: Trade, 19 July 2016. p. 14, https://ec.europa.eu/
info/publications/strategic-plan-2016-2020-trade_en (accessed 9 October 2017).
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Parliament.3 In response, the European Commission ﬁrst instigated a debate about
TSD chapters by producing a ‘non-paper’ on the subject, and then producing a
second non-paper in which it sets out ‘the way forward on improving the imple-
mentation and enforcement of Trade and Sustainable Development chapters’.4
The authors of this article came together in order to respond to the questions
posed by the European Commission in its ﬁrst non-paper, speciﬁcally focusing
on the labour provisions within TSD chapters and how they might be reformed
in the future.5 As academics who have all conducted extensive research into the
functioning of labour provisions, we felt well placed to review the existing evi-
dence-base about how such provisions have been operating, to explore the limita-
tions and failures of the current model, and to make suggestions in relation to the
reform agenda proposed by the European Commission. In undertaking this work,
we seek to engage not only with those who are interested speciﬁcally in the trade–
labour linkage, but also a broader audience concerned with the social dimensions
of trade policy. The EU aspires to put social values at the heart of its trade policy-
making and its rhetoric suggests that labour standards provisions are critical to this
endeavour. But scrutiny of the effect of the EU’s approach and related policy impli-
cations has not been at the centre of academic debates in this ﬁeld. Many of the
most highly cited journal articles on the topic have instead tended to assess the via-
bility or legitimacy of FTA labour provisions in hypothetical terms and have
engaged predominantly with the US position.6 By ﬁlling this lacuna, our intention
3 European Commission, Non-paper of the Commission services Trade and Sustainable Development
(TSD) Chapters in EU Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), 11 July 2017, p. 2, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2017/july/tradoc_155686.pdf (accessed 9 October 2017).
4 European Commission, supra n. 3; European Commission, Feedback and Way Forward on
Improving the Implementation and Enforcement of Trade and Sustainable Development Chapters in
EU Free Trade Agreements, 26 February, 2018, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/february/
tradoc_156618.pdf (accessed 3 March 2018). A non-paper is a contribution submitted as a basis for
discussion, seeking reaction of other parties to possible solutions, without necessarily committing to a
public position on the addressed matter. Non-papers are not ofﬁcial documents of an (EU) institution,
they are also not published within the context of a formal consultation. The European Commission will
also publish later this year its ﬁrst annual report on the implementation of Free Trade Agreements. This
will give details on the implementation of the TSD chapter in each EU FTA.
5M. Barbu, L. Campling, F. Ebert, J. Harrison, D. Martens, A. Marx, J. Orbie, B. Richardson, and
A. Smith, A Response to the Non-paper of the European Commission on Trade and Sustainable
Development (TSD) chapters in EU Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) (26 September 2017), www.geog.
qmul.ac.uk/media/geography/docs/research/working-beyond-the-border/A-Response-to-the-Nonpaper-
26.09.17.pdf (accessed 9 October 2017).
6 J. Bhagwati, ‘Trade Liberalisation and ‘Fair Trade’ Demands: Addressing the Environmental and
Labour Standards Issues’, The World Economy, 18(6) (1995): 745−759; S. Charnowitz, ‘The Inﬂuence
of International Labour Standards on the World Trade Regime: A Historical Overview’, International
Labour Review, 126 (1987): 565; D. K. Brown, ‘Labor Standards: Where Do They Belong on the
International Agenda?’, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(3) (2001): 89−112; E. Lee
‘Globalization and Labour Standards: A Review of Issues’, International Labour Review, 136(2)
(1997): 173−189; S. Polaski, ‘Protecting Labor Rights through Trade Agreements: An Analytical
Guide’, U.C. Davis Journal of International Law and Policy, 10(13) (2003): 15−25.
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is to provoke more widespread discussion within both the academic and trade
policy community about the current practice and future potential of the trade–
labour linkage and whether it can contribute signiﬁcantly to sustainable trade
policy, or to use the language of the Commission, to making ‘trade for all’.7 The
remainder of this article is structured as follows. In section 2, we set out the key
components of the EU’s labour standards provisions as contained in the TSD chap-
ters of EU trade agreements and compare and contrast this approach with that of
the US. In section 3, we review the academic studies that have examined the effect-
iveness of the EU’s TSD chapters, and identify nine key failures and limitations
which are undermining the current approach. In section 4, we examine the
European Commission’s proposals for reform of the TSD chapters and identify a
number of positive ideas that, if properly acted upon, could signiﬁcantly strengthen
the existing model. Alongside this, we identify various limitations and concerns
with the current reform agenda. Finally, in section 5, we stress the importance of
thinking imaginatively about how the various legal obligations and institutional
mechanisms created by trade agreements can best be harnessed to further a
labour standards provisions agenda. This involves situating TSD chapters in rela-
tion to other aspects of the trade agreements rather than treating them in isolation,
and introducing other governance mechanisms for improving working conditions
and rights at work.
2. Labour standards provisions in EU trade agreements
The EU has a long history of including labour standards provisions within its trade
policy-making. It has included labour provisions in its unilateral Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP) with developing countries since the mid-1990s, ﬁrst
through a sanctioning mechanism (since 1995) and then through special incentives
for countries complying with the International Labour Organization (ILO) core
labour standards (since 1999). In 2005, the latter was extended to become the
GSP+ scheme granting additional tariff preferences to a small number of countries
that ratify and implement sustainable development and good governance conven-
tions.8 In 1999, the EU signed an FTA with South Africa, which for the ﬁrst time
made reference to the ILO core labour standards, closely followed by the
Cotonou Agreement in 2000, with the African, Caribbean, and Paciﬁc group of
77 countries committing to these same standards.9 Following the Treaty of
7 European Commission, supra n. 1.
8 Examining the functioning and effectiveness of GSP+, see e.g. B. Richardson, J. Harrison, and
L. Campling, Labour Rights in Export Processing Zones with a Focus on GSP+ Beneﬁciary Countries,
Brussels: European Union Directorate-General for External Policies Policy Department (2017); J. Orbie
and L. Tortell, ‘The New GSP+ Beneﬁciaries: Ticking the Box or Truly Consistent with ILO Findings?’,
European Foreign Affairs Review, 14(5) (2009): 663–681.
9 L. Van Den Putte, F. Bossuyt, J. Orbie, and F. De Ville, ‘Social Norms in EU Bilateral Trade
Agreements: A Comparative Overview’, in T. Takacs, A. Ott, and A. Dimopoulos (eds.), Linking Trade
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Lisbon adopted in 2007 that accorded greater inﬂuence to the European Parliament
in trade policy, the level of ambition around the trade–labour linkage has ‘signiﬁ-
cantly deepened and widened’.10 These ambitions were ﬁrst acted upon within the
2008 Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the EU and 15 Caribbean
states (CARIFORUM), which saw the introduction of new governance procedures
and reference made to more social policy norms. Since completing the negotiations
for the EU–South Korea FTA in 2009, labour standards provisions have been pack-
aged with rules around environmental protection in Trade and Sustainable
Development (TSD) chapters. Such chapters have since featured in ﬁnalized agree-
ments with Canada, Colombia/Peru (later joined by Ecuador), Central America
(Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama),
Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Singapore, and Vietnam. As of March 2018, they
were also included in draft negotiating texts in the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership with the US,11 the Comprehensive Economic Partnership
Agreement with Indonesia,12 and the EU–Mercosur Association Agreement.13
While there is some variation between the provisions in the different agreements
as a result of the negotiation process with individual trading partners, the essential
elements of TSD chapters are retained across all recent EU FTAs. This common
formulation approach can be deﬁned in terms of the substantive labour standards
and procedural commitments relied upon, the institutional structures created, and
the way that complaints are handled.14
In terms of substantive standards, all the agreements involve the parties making
commitments in relation to the ILO’s eight core labour conventions included in the
1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.15 These
and Non-Commercial Interests: The EU as a Global Role Model, CLEER Working Papers (2013), pp. 35
−48.
10 L. Van den Putte and J. Orbie, ‘EU Bilateral Trade Agreements and the Surprising Rise of Labour
Provisions’, International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 31(3) (2015):
263–283, at 264.
11 See European Commission, EU Textual Proposal for a Trade and Sustainable Development
Chapter, 2015, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153923.pdf (accessed 12
October 2017).
12 See European Commission, EU Proposal for Trade and Sustainable Development, Explanatory
Note− September 2017, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/september/tradoc_156111.pdf (accessed
19 October 2017).
13 See European Commission, EU Textual Proposal: Trade and Sustainable Development, 2015,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1644 (accessed 24 October 2017).
14 This characterization of the provisions is drawn from J. Harrison, M. Barbu, L. Campling,
B. Richardson, and A. Smith, ‘Governing Labour Standards through Free Trade Agreements: Limits of
the European Union’s Trade and Sustainable Development Chapters’, Journal of Common Market
Studies (2018), https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12715 (accessed 26 June 2018). For a more detailed exposition
and characterization of key provisions, see L. Bartels, ‘Human Rights and Sustainable Development
Obligations in EU Free Trade Agreements’, Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 40(4) (2013): 297−314.
15 The text of the Declaration is available at http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/textdeclara-
tion/lang--en/index.htm (accessed 23 March 2018). On the importance of EU agreements referencing the
ILO’s Fundamental Conventions and the implications of these in terms of the commitments of the
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conventions deal with freedom of association and collective bargaining, forced and
compulsory labour, child labour, and workplace-related discrimination. Also refer-
enced are commitments expressed in political declarations such as the 2006
Ministerial Declaration of the UN Economic and Social Council on Attainment
of Full and Productive Employment and Decent Work for All. These substantive
standards are accompanied by a set of procedural commitments, including those
on dialogue and cooperation (via the institutional structures mentioned below);
monitoring and review of the sustainability impacts of the agreement; a commit-
ment to uphold levels of domestic protection in relation to labour standards; a com-
mitment not to use labour standards for the purposes of disguised protectionism;
and a commitment not to weaken or waive laws to encourage trade or investment.
In terms of institutional structures, all TSD chapters include the establishment of
a joint committee comprised of representatives of the two parties who will oversee
the implementation of the relevant chapter. They also include a civil society mech-
anism which brings together representatives of business, trade unions, non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs), and – although not explicitly mentioned in the text
of the TSD chapters – occasionally academia into Domestic Advisory Groups
(DAGs) in each of the trading partners. TSD chapters also facilitate international
dialogue between these DAGs and/or other civil society actors of both the EU
and its trading partner(s) in a joint Civil Society Forum (CSF).
Complaints concerning the implementation of TSD chapters are not covered by
the trade agreement’s general dispute settlement mechanism. TSD chapters contain
their own dispute resolution mechanism consisting of government consultations
and, if necessary, the establishment of a panel of experts. As such, no party can
bring an action that would result in the suspension of trade preferences against
the other party, that is there is no sanctioning power.16
It is with respect to this issue of enforcement that the EU’s approach is most
commonly contrasted with the US model of labour provisions in its FTAs.
Complaints around labour provisions in the US agreements are covered by the
same chapter on dispute settlement as those concerning other provisions of the
trade agreement, meaning that there are potentially signiﬁcant and symbolically
powerful ﬁnancial or trade-based penalties if violations are found.17 US FTAs
parties, see J. Agustí-Panareda, F. Christian Ebert, and D. LeClercq, ‘ILO Labor Standards and
Trade Agreements: A Case for Consistency’, Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal, 36(3) (2015):
347−380.
16 An exception is the EU-CARIFORUM EPA of 2008, which subjects its labour and environmental
chapters to regular dispute settlement but excludes the application of trade sanctions for this purpose.
This agreement includes some labour and environmental provisions in its investment chapter to which
the full sanctions mechanism applies. See Bartels, pp. 301−311, supra n. 14.
17 The exact procedures and penalties for non-compliance can differ. For instance, in the US-DR-
CAFTA FTA, there is a cap of $15m compensation that can be imposed for non-implementation of
labour laws and environmental laws, whereas for non-implementation of other rules the penalty that
can be imposed is unrestricted. See, e.g., A. Marx, F. Ebert, N. Hachez, and J. Wouters, Dispute
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also include a more open system for receiving and responding to complaints on
labour issues.18
Largely because of these differences in relation to enforcement, the ILO differ-
entiates between the US and EU approaches to labour provisions. The US approach
is termed a conditional one, which links ‘compliance with labour standards to eco-
nomic consequences’.19 In contrast, the EU approach is categorized as an exclu-
sively promotional approach since its provisions ‘do not link compliance to
economic consequences but provide a framework for dialogue, cooperation, and/
or monitoring’.20 Despite these differences, the EU and US approaches also have
a great deal in common. Both place great weight on the 1998 ILO Declaration
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and identify obligations in relation
to core labour standards,21 both seek to prevent a weakening of labour law to
attract investment and increase exports (the ‘race to the bottom’), both seek to
involve civil society in the negotiation and monitoring of provisions, and both
establish dispute settlement procedures involving inter-governmental dialogue
and expert panels (although methods of enforcement do differ).
Recognizing these commonalities in aims and approaches is important, since
debates about labour provisions in EU FTAs have tended to be based on the
assumption that any reform must proceed in either a conditional or promotional
direction. As we show later, this false dichotomy is doubly problematic. First, by
highlighting the major difference in terms of enforcement, academics as well as
policy-makers fail to observe other relevant differences, including on pre-ratiﬁca-
tion conditionality, institutional capacities, and development ﬁnancing. Second,
the focus on EU−US differences has both restricted appreciation of the way that
the EU might learn from the US experience, and drawn attention away from
aims and instruments that neither approach currently embodies.22
Before moving on to investigate effects, it is also important to understand what
kind of labour standards the EU’s approach seeks to tackle. The most common
Settlement in the Trade and Sustainable Development Chapters of EU Trade Agreements, Leuven Centre
for Global Governance Studies (2017), https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/books/ﬁnal-report-9-
february-def.pdf, (accessed on 26 June 2018), pp. 34, 41.
18 To be considered, the allegations must raise issues relevant to the labour provisions (or speciﬁed
labour provisions) in the FTA and illustrate a country’s failure to comply with its obligations. If the sub-
mission meets these criteria, the US Ofﬁce of Trade and Labor Affairs (OTLA) will accept the submission
for review.
19 ILO, Social Dimensions of Free Trade Agreements (Geneva: ILO, 2013, revised edition in 2015),
p. 5.
20 ILO, p. 1, supra n. 19. It should be noted that the European Commission contests this interpretation
of its approach and presents its model as including a ‘binding’ dispute settlement mechanism. See e.g.
European Commission supra, n. 3.
21 Although there is an important debate about the legal effects of referencing only the ILO
Declaration, as opposed to directly referencing the ILO Conventions in the text of trade agreements. On
this see, Agustí-Panareda, Ebert, and LeClercq, supra n. 15.
22 A similar argument is made by K. Kolben, ‘A Supply Chain Approach to Trade and Labor
Provisions’, Politics and Governance, 5(4) (2017): 60−68.
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hypothesis within the academic literature is that EU labour provisions are seeking to
have some positive impact on the lives of workers (whether or not they work in
internationally traded industries) in countries that are signatories to the relevant
trade agreements.23 But pronouncements by DG Trade Commissioner
Malmström, as well as text in recent agreements, suggest that there may also be a
second, international dimension; TSD chapters are intended to be the key provisions
within EU FTAs for making global supply chains ‘more responsible’ and therefore
are concerned with jobs in speciﬁc export-oriented industries, potentially including
those outside the jurisdictions of the signatory states.24 Under this interpretation,
TSD chapters are building blocks towards improving the conditions of workers
in internationally traded goods and services. A third interpretation is that labour
standards provisions are included to address the social impacts of the trade agree-
ment itself. Such a reading is supported by the fact that all TSD chapters contain
an obligation to monitor the impact of the trade agreement itself on sustainable
development.25 It is also supported by arguments that the inclusion of more
extensive labour standards provisions within recent trade agreements is to counter-
balance the signiﬁcant growth in commercially orientated ‘market-creating’
provisions in those same agreements.26 Being clear about the particular
pathways through which TSD chapters are intended to have positive effects is key
when it comes to evaluating their impacts, as well as deciding upon the reforms
to prioritise.
3. What are the effects of the EU’s labour standards provisions?
A number of studies have examined the institutional design and implementation of
the EU’s TSD chapters, by investigating the functioning of those chapters both with
respect to the EU and the EU’s trading partners.27 These studies have found a series
23 E.g. E. Postnikov and I. Bastiaens, ‘Does Dialogue Work? The Effectiveness of labor Standards in
EU Preferential Trade Agreements’, Journal of European Public Policy, 21(6) (2014): 923−940.
24 C. Malmström, ‘Responsible Supply Chains: What’s the EU Doing?’, European Commission, 7
December 2015, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/december/tradoc_154020.pdf (accessed on
23 March 2018).
25 E.g. see South Korea−EU FTA, Article 13.10, Moldova−EU Association Agreement Article 374,
CARIFORUM EU EPA, Article 195.
26 L. Van den Putte, L. and J. Orbie, ‘EU Bilateral Trade Agreements and the Surprising Rise of Labour
Provisions’, International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 31(3) (2015):
263–283, at 281.
27 See A. Marx, B. Lein, and N. Brando, ‘The Protection of Labour Rights in Trade Agreements: The
Case of the EU−Colombia Agreement’, Journal of World Trade, 50(4) (2016): 587−610; F. Ebert, ‘Labour
Provisions in EU Trade Agreements’, International Labour Review, 155(3) (2016): 407–433; F. Ebert,
‘The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA): Are Existing Arrangements Sufﬁcient to
Prevent Adverse Effects on Labour Standards?’, International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and
Industrial Relations 33(2) (2017): 295−329; J. Orbie and L. Van den Putte, Labour Rights in Peru and
the EU Trade Agreement: Compliance with the Commitments under the Sustainable Development
Chapter, OFSE Working Paper (2016), 58, www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/145974 (accessed 9 October
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of important limitations and failings with the current operation of TSD chapters in
a variety of different contexts. We set out nine key ﬁndings of these studies below.
First, EU actors who are involved in the negotiation and implementation of TSD
chapters view their role as very limited.28 Opportunities to use sustainability impact
assessments and ‘pre-ratiﬁcation conditinality’ – i.e, requirements for necessary
changes in the domestic legislative system of a trade partner before the agreement
enters into force – to make signiﬁcant progress on labour standards in trade
partners have been missed.29 In comparison, the US has utilized pre-ratiﬁcation
leverage more successfully in relation to some of its trade partners.30 During the
negotiations, commitments to more ambitious labour provisions could also have
been pursued.
Once agreements are in force, key EU interlocutors often lack detailed knowl-
edge of relevant labour issues in trade partner countries and have not prioritized
labour issues in their discussions with trade partner representatives.31 For instance,
a study on the implementation of labour standards provisions under the EU–Peru–
Colombia FTA suggested that, on the one hand, commitments on labour standards,
as well as civil society dialogue, are not considered a priority for the trade section at
the EU Delegation, whereas the cooperation section does have more expertise in
this area but is not involved in the implementation of the TSD chapter.32 While
2017); L. Van den Putte ‘Involving Civil Society in Social Clauses and the Decent Work Agenda’, Global
Labour Journal, 6(2) (2015): 221−235; Harrison et al., supra n. 14; A. Smith, M. Barbu, J. Harrison,
B. Richardson, and L. Campling, ‘Labour provisions in the European Union−Republic of Moldova
Association Agreement’, Handbook on Assessment of Labour Provisions in Trade and Investment
Agreements (Geneva: ILO, 2017), pp. 87−97; A. Smith, M. Barbu, L. Campling, J. Harrison, and B.
Richardson, ‘Labour Regimes, Global Production Networks, and European Union Trade Policy:
International Labour Standards and Export Production in the Moldovan Clothing Industry’, Economic
Geography (2018), https://doi.org/10.1080/00130095.2018.1434410; J. Vogt, ‘The Evolution of Labor
Rights and Trade−A Transatlantic Comparison and Lessons for the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership’, Journal of International Economic Law, 18(4) (2015): 827–860; J. Orbie,
D. Martens, M. Oehri, and L. Van den Putte ‘Promoting Sustainable Development or Legitimising Free
Trade? Civil Society Mechanisms in EU Trade Agreements’, Third World Thematics, 1(4) (2016);
J. Orbie, D. Martens, and L. Van den Putte, Civil Society Meetings in European Union Trade,
Agreements: Features, Purposes, and Evaluation, CLEER Papers (2016/3), www.asser.nl/media/3044/
cleer16-3_web.pdf (accessed 9 October 2017). A. N. Tran, J. Bair, and M. Werner, ‘Forcing Change
from the Outside? The Role of Trade–Labour Linkages in Transforming Vietnam’s Labour Regime’,
Competition and Change, 21(5) (2017): 397–416. Providing a framework for the analysis of impact, see
J. Aissi, R. Peels, and D. Samaan, ‘Evaluating the Effectiveness of Labour Provisions in Trade
Agreements: An Analytical Framework’, International Labour Review, 8 September 2017; L. Campling,
J. Harrison, B. Richardson, and A. Smith, ‘Can Labour Provisions Work beyond the Border? Evaluating
the Effects of EU Free Trade Agreements’, International Labour Review, 155(3) (2016): 357–382.
28Harrison et al., supra n. 14; Orbie and Van Den Putte, supra n. 27.
29 ILO, supra n. 19; Harrison et al., supra n.14, Orbie and Van Den Putte, supra n. 27; Vogt, supra
n. 27.
30 Vogt, supra n. 27 ; ILO, supra n. 19.
31Harrison et al., supra n. 14.
32Orbie and Van den Putte, supra n. 27
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such institutional compartmentalization is inherent to any political system, the
separation between different ﬁlières is arguably stronger in the EU.
Second, government ofﬁcials from trading partners with responsibility for
engaging with labour issues within the institutions of the TSD chapters often do
not see these issues as their responsibility and/or are not the most appropriate
representatives for the task in hand. Such ofﬁcials are often not based in labour
ministries or other relevant governmental departments.33 This poses problems in
terms of ownership of the labour agenda by governments who have signed up to
obligations contained in trade agreements and for achieving appropriate follow-
up on relevant issues.
Third, civil society mechanisms (CSMs) institutionalized through TSD chapters
are hampered by operational failings including: problems of resourcing; lack of
meetings and insufﬁcient substantive discussions where meetings do take place;
difﬁculties with obtaining expert and representative members for CSMs; lack of
awareness of the existence of CSMs among relevant domestic constituencies; lack
of information-sharing on issues relevant to the work of CSMs; lack of independ-
ence from government; and inadequate inter-relationships with other bodies insti-
tutionalized within the TSD chapter.34 The overall purposes and functions of CSMs
are also not entirely clear: for instance, do they have a monitoring function in rela-
tion to the impacts of the labour (as well as wider sustainability) impacts of the
trade agreement itself?35 The expectation that CSMs will cover a wide variety of
labour, social, and environmental concerns under the rubric of ‘sustainable devel-
opment’ has also made focused discussion difﬁcult, with some studies suggesting
that meetings on these topics should be institutionally separated out.36
Fourth, despite the focus on cooperative activities in the text of the TSD chapters,
such provisions have not been systematically implemented through relevant EU
instruments.37 Further, no systematic evaluation of the cooperative activities
conducted under the TSD chapters has taken place. There is also the question of
policy coherence across EU institutions, for example, the EU’s development cooper-
ation arrangements do not systematically address labour issues in the EU’s trade
partners.38 An additional problem is that EU aid to upper middle-income countries,
such as Colombia and Peru, will phase out, which further undermines the
33Marx et al. supra n. 27; Harrison et al., supra n. 14.
34Orbie and Van Den Putte, supra n. 27; Marx et al. supra n. 27; Harrison et al., supra n. 14; Van Den
Putte supra n. 27; Orbie et al. supra n. 27; Orbie, Martens, and Van den Putte supra n. 27.
35Harrison et al., supra n. 14; Orbie, Martens and Van den Putte, supra n. 27.
36 F. De Ville, J. Orbie, and L. Van den Putte, ‘TTIP and Labour Standards’, European Commission
Directorate General for Internal Policies, IP/A/EMPL/2015-07, June 2016, www.europarl.europa.eu/
RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/578992/IPOL_STU(2016)578992_EN.pdf (accessed 19 October 2017).
37 Ebert (2016), supra n. 27: Harrison et al., supra n. 14; Orbie and Van Den Putte, supra n. 27. A
number of ad hoc projects have been carried out, as identiﬁed in European Commission, supra n. 4.
38 Ebert (2016), supra n. 27.
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possibilities to strategically link trade and aid policies for the improvement of labour
standards.39
Fifth, the dispute resolution process appears insufﬁcient. As mentioned above,
TSD chapters are exempt from the general dispute settlement mechanism of EU
FTAs and disputes are instead examined by panels of experts. This process has
not yet been activated in any relevant FTA, despite, for example, serious issues
being raised in relation to labour violations in South Korea. It is not simply the
inadequacies of the legal process itself. The fact that the TSD chapter lacks a cred-
ible enforcement mechanism means that it is more difﬁcult to induce compliance
with obligations contained in the TSD chapter in the processes of dialogue that
take place between the trade partners.40 The absence of a credible enforcement
mechanism also discourages trade unions, who often work with limited staff and
resources, to mobilize around possible violations of the TSD chapters.
Sixth, the EU’s common formulation approach to TSD chapters (i.e. a focus on the
same labour standards pursued via the same processes of dialogue and cooperation in
all FTAs) appears ill-equipped to deal with the complexity of labour issues encoun-
tered within diverse trading partner scenarios. The ILO core labour standards,
which are at the heart of the EU model, are not the most pressing worker-related
concerns in all trading partners. For instance, trade-related unemployment in the
Caribbean and poverty wages in Moldova have arguably been bigger issues for
workers in those locations. Conversely, in South Korea, where core labour standards
are a concern, the government crackdown on trade unions in 2015−2016 calls into
question the utility of an approach based on dialogue and cooperation.41Where indi-
vidual ‘roadmaps’ have been produced in addition to the TSD chapters in EU FTAs,
there has been insufﬁcient follow-up to ensure compliance.42 Again, this is in contrast
to the US, which has devoted more resources to monitoring follow-up.
Seventh, the provisions contained in TSD chapters regarding the monitoring and
assessing of the ‘sustainability’ impacts of the agreement itself, including on labour
standards, have not been properly operationalized.43 Furthermore, the relevant
provisions are vague, leaving the parties a signiﬁcant amount of leeway with
regard to the modalities of monitoring, and there is little evidence that vigorous
monitoring has been conducted. Also, no appropriate mechanism is in place to
ensure that any identiﬁed negative effects of the FTA on labour standards are
adequately remedied. As a result, the potential of TSD chapters to ensure that
working conditions are not adversely affected by the FTA is signiﬁcantly reduced.44
39Orbie and Van Den Putte, supra n. 27
40Marx et al., supra n. 27; Harrison et al., supra n. 14; Ebert (2016) supra n. 27; Tran et al., supra
n. 27.
41Harrison et al., supra n. 14.
42 Vogt, supra n. 27.
43Harrison et al., supra n. 14; Marx et al., supra n. 27.
44 Ebert (2017), supra n. 27.
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Eighth, despite the formally reciprocal nature of the provisions, there is scant
evidence that they have been operationalized in a way that considers labour
issues within the EU.45 This raises questions about whether the EU’s model is
actually designed to be a two-way process of dialogue, or if it rather represents a
form of ‘sophisticated unilateralism’ wherein more powerful states negotiate
provisions that reﬂect their own unilateral agenda, embedding them within a
formally reciprocal structure.46
Ninth, efforts to extend the reach of labour provisions beyond the trade rela-
tionship between the two trade partners and to engage with labour issues in
global supply chains are limited. The FTA provisions on such links are vague.
Activities have largely focused on encouraging voluntary corporate social respon-
sibility initiatives, which are restricted in scope, vigor, and potential future
impact.47
Overall, these studies have therefore failed to ﬁnd positive impacts of labour
standards provisions for the situation of workers in the EU or its trade partners.
Indeed, in two studies it was found that governments had actually sought to
weaken labour standards protection (Peru successfully and South Korea unsuc-
cessfully) since the trade agreements with the EU came into force.48 Given the
signiﬁcant structural problems identiﬁed, the ﬁndings of these studies also raise
serious questions about whether the current EU model has the potential to
achieve signiﬁcant changes to working conditions and rights at work in the
longer term.
We should note here that there are a small number of academic studies which
argue that there are positive impacts of EU trade agreements on some labour stan-
dards, in particular relating to de jure collective labour law.49 Methodologically,
these are based on quantitative analysis of collective labour law and/or Brussels-
45Harrison et al., supra n. 14.
46 F. Ebert, The United States’ Approach to Labour Provisions in Trade Agreements in the Pre-Trump
Era: Lessons for the European Union’s Trade Policy, Presentation at Labour Provisions, Trade Agreements
and Global Value Chains Research Workshop, London, 15 June 2017.
47 Smith et al. (2018), supra n. 27; Harrison et al., supra n. 14; More broadly on this issue, see
R. M. Locke, The Promise and Limits of Private Power: Promoting Labor Standards in a Global
Economy (Cambridge University Press, 2013).
48Orbie and Van den Putte, supra n. 27, Harrison et al., supra n. 14. This potentially violates a key
procedural provision of the TSD chapter; that signatory states should not ‘weaken or reduce the …
labour protections afforded in its laws to encourage trade or investment’, South Korea−EU FTA, Article
13.7. Although South Korean efforts were unsuccessful, at no point was the TSD chapter activated to
contest these proposed reforms. In 2015, the Park Geun-hye administration pushed a number of repressive
reforms to domestic labour law. The enactment of this suite of legal proposals was delayed by a large
backlog of legislation, the Saenuri Party’s failure to maintain a majority in the National Assembly in
2016, and Park’s 2017 impeachment.
49 Postnikov, E. andBastiaens, supran. 23;M.Garcia andA.Masselot, ‘EU−Asia FreeTradeAgreements
as Tools for Social Norm/Legislation Transfer’, Asia Europe Journal, 13(3) (2015): 241−252; D. Raess,
Labour Clauses in Trade Agreements: Worker Protection or Protectionism? (September 2017), www.etui.
org/content/download/32542/301999/ﬁle/Presentation+ETUI+event+Raess.pdf (accessed 9 October 2017).
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based interviews with key informants.50 As such, they are not designed to provide a
detailed understanding of how TSD chapters have been operationalized (or not) in
third country contexts, and so do not, in any detail, identify strengths or deﬁcien-
cies within the TSD model itself. They also struggle to engage with important ques-
tions about causality, i.e. is it the TSD chapters, the wider trade agreement, or other
domestic and international factors which are causing any positive effects that occur
for the protection of labour standards in trading partners?
Some of the EU’s more recently negotiated agreements do contain some add-
itional content beyond that which is analysed in existing studies. In particular,
the EU–Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) contains
additional substantive provisions (for instance on the health and safety of workers)
and more detailed requirements on enforcement of labour standards at the domes-
tic level (referencing labour inspection and the judiciary). But overall, it is not a
signiﬁcant departure from the existing approach, in particular concerning the
implementation mechanisms which largely reproduce the EU’s standard approach
in terms of dialogue and cooperation. Moreover, CETA does not come with appro-
priate provisions to ensure that its regulatory content, e.g. in the area of investor
protection or regulatory cooperation, does not adversely affect labour standards.
These concerns are also not assuaged by the ‘Joint Interpretative Instrument’,
adopted to facilitate the signing of CETA in October 2016.51 For these reasons,
CETA is likely to be largely subject to the same limitations as earlier EU trade
agreements.
4. The European Commission’s proposals for reform
In July 2017, the European Commission published a non-paper which presented
two options for reform of its TSD chapters and the labour provisions contained
within them.52 The ﬁrst option involved enhancing the current processes of dia-
logue and cooperation contained within existing agreements and being more
‘assertive’ in terms of using the complaints mechanism and other forms of leverage.
The second option was to create a ‘model with sanctions’. This focused on the idea
of importing a stronger dispute settlement system into the EU model, drawing on
the example of the US (as well as the Canadian) approach for inspiration. After
a period of dialogue and consultation around these reform proposals, in
February 2018, the Commission published a second non-paper, which found in
50 Studies based on large-N datasets of labour legislation can make wider generalisations about de jure
labour rights but they cannot speak to the de facto implementation of such rights.
51 Ebert (2017), supra n. 27; see also Lorand Bartels, ‘Human Rights, Labour Standards and
Environmental Standards in CETA’, in S. Griller, W. Obwexer, and E. Vranes (eds.), Mega-Regional
Trade Agreements: CETA, TTIP, and TiSA: New Orientations for EU External Economic Relations
(Oxford University Press, 2017).
52 European Commission, supra n. 4.
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favour of the ﬁrst option on the basis that there was ‘a clear consensus that the
implementation of TSD chapters should be stepped-up and improved’. At the
same time, the Commission made clear its own misgivings about a sanctions-
based model and stated that its consultations had revealed ‘divergent points of
view’ on this issue. In the absence of consensus, it was ‘impossible to move to
such an approach’.53
The second non-paper therefore sets out a series of actions to ‘revamp the TSD
chapters’.54 One aspect of this agenda is that the Commission promises to work
more closely, and communicate better with key stakeholders, including a promise
of closer partnerships between the Commission, the European Parliament, EU
Member States, and relevant international organizations, including the ILO, to
promote the TSD agenda in partner countries. The Commission also commits to
more public transparency in relation to the activities of TSD institutions, better
communication in relation to progress made on TSD commitments, and to
respond to submissions from stakeholders within set time periods. Alongside
this, there are a series of actions set out to improve the way that the TSD chapters
function, and the outcomes they achieve in trade partner countries. It is worth
noting that the proposals for reform are couched entirely in terms of action
required in trade partners rather than within EU Member States, meaning that
our eighth ﬁnding in section 3 above has not been addressed. Putting that issue
aside, we identify ﬁve important actions proposed by the Commission and
explain why they may address some of the criticisms set out in section 3 above.
At the same time, we identify important further steps for their implementation
and/or limitations in the way actions are currently conceived.
First, the Commission proposes to separately ‘identify, consider and address pri-
orities for each partner country’ in relation to TSD issues. This involves moving
from the current one-size ﬁts all approach. It may lead to the inclusion of speciﬁc
issues in FTAs beyond the standard TSD formulation, and will involve the identiﬁ-
cation of priority issues for implementation by trade partners. As highlighted
above, labour standards issues are often very different across trade partners, as
are the strategies needed for achieving change. This commitment is therefore
extremely important. Its effectiveness depends on how it is operationalized. This
must involve the development of detailed action plans that focus on the key
concerns identiﬁed in each trade partnership. As labour standards tend to be sen-
sitive for partner country governments and have not always been a priority for
the EU, there is a risk that other TSD chapter issues such as environmental protec-
tion or corporate social responsibility initiatives will be prioritized over key labour
standards concerns. The content of actions plans should therefore be carefully
scrutinized and there must then be concerted follow-up to ensure action plans
53Quotations at European Commission, pp. 2–3, supra n. 4.
54 European Commission, p. 2, supra n. 4.
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are acted upon (see ﬁfth point below for more on this).55 Such action plans can be
developed informally in relation to existing agreements, but should be formally
mandated in relation to future agreements.
Second, the European Commission proposes to ‘encourage early ratiﬁcation of
core international agreements’ (including the eight ILO Conventions underpinning
the core labour standards) during the negotiation of new trade agreements. This
would be coherent with the EU’s approach towards GSP beneﬁciaries, which
requires compliance with the ILO core conventions. A shift towards stronger
forms of pre-ratiﬁcation conditionality is important because this is when the EU
is in the strongest position to press for legislative change in trade partners.56
Strong forms of conditionality will increase the potential for relevant labour stan-
dards to be incorporated into the domestic law of trade partners. Research suggests
the importance of the US’s efforts with regard to pre-ratiﬁcation conditionality in
some of its trade negotiations; compared to the EU, the US has been more insistent
that certain changes are made to labour law in prospective FTA partners prior to the
agreement being signed.57 There is evidence to suggest that these measures have
supported domestic pressure for change in certain countries and are considered
one of the strongest forms of leverage that trading partners can exert.58 At the
same time, while getting standards into law is necessary (so that it can be used as
a key reference point to contest worker abuses), it is not sufﬁcient to ensure positive
improvements in working conditions and rights at work in practice.59 These latter
issues could be tackled during the negotiation phase by requirements for trade
partners to act upon the observations made by the ILO’s Committee of Experts
on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, so that conventions
are not only ratiﬁed but also effectively implemented. Effective action is then also
needed once trade agreements are in force.
55Harrison et al., supra n. 14; Orbie and Van Den Putte, supra n. 27; Vogt, supra n. 27. As identiﬁed
above, there is no reason why these roadmaps should not also involve commitments by EU members states
to also take action in their own territories on key labour issues.
56 A. Smith, L. Campling, M. Barbu, J. Harrison, and B. Richardson (2017), ‘Anchoring Labour
Rights More Effectively in EU Trade Agreements’, Social Europe, 13 July 2017, www.socialeurope.eu/
anchoring-labour-rights-effectively-eu-trade-agreements (accessed 9 October 2017); ILO, supra n. 19.
57 Comparing the two approaches and their results, see ILO, supra n. 19. Comparing US and EU
approaches in Vietnam speciﬁcally, see Tran et al., supra n. 27 and Alice Evans, ‘Aiding Reform, In
Context, Working Paper, available from authors.
58 See e.g. D. Cheong and F. Ebert, ‘Labour Law and Trade Policy: What Implications for Economic
and Human Development?’, in S. Marshall and C. Fenwick (eds.), Labour Regulation and Development:
Socio-Legal Perspectives (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2016), pp. 82−126; ILO, supra n. 19.
59 For instance, evaluations of labour reforms actually carried out in Peru and Colombia, as a result of
US efforts, found that progress was very limited, e.g. see Vogt, supra n. 27. On the limits of the US
−Cambodia Textile Agreement, see International Human Rights and Conﬂict Resolution Clinic and
Worker Rights Consortium, Monitoring in the Dark: An Evaluation of the International Labour
Organization’s Better Factories Cambodia Monitoring and Reporting Programme (2013), https://human-
rightsclinic.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Monitoring-in-the-Dark-Stanford-WRC.pdf
(accessed 9 October 2017).
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Third, the European Commission makes the important proposal to better enable
‘civil society including the Social Partners to play their role in implementation’.60
As catalogued above, a number of studies have identiﬁed serious operational
issues with the functioning of Domestic Advisory Groups (DAGs) and Joint Civil
Society Forums (CSFs). The Commission addresses this through a €3 million
fund to better facilitate civil society activity and will also create clearer guidelines
for the functioning of DAGs and CSFs. The commitment by the Commission to
respond to all ‘written submissions from citizens on TSD [matters] in a structured,
transparent, and time-bound way’ also means civil society actors have a mechanism
by which they can pressure for responses to their concerns.61 While these actions
may have a positive effect on current operational deﬁciencies, there are also
issues that are more fundamental which need to be addressed. These include: (1)
recognizing that ‘civil society’ takes different forms in different trade partners
and adapting institutions accordingly;62 (2) ensuring that civil society actors have
rights and resources that are commensurate with their roles and duties, e.g. to
allow them to commission studies of issues they identify as requiring further ana-
lysis; and (3) creating greater clarity as to what the role of civil society actually is
in relation to the TSD chapter and the wider trade agreement. On this last point,
the Commission argues that currently DAGs and CSFs are only competent to
discuss and advise on implementation of TSD chapters.63 But in future agreements,
DAGs and CSFs will be able ‘to cover the implementation of the whole agree-
ment’.64 This clariﬁcation could produce positive results if it means that DAGs
and CSFs are empowered to undertake or commission proper monitoring of the
‘sustainability’ impacts of the FTA as a whole, something that has been missing
up to this point.65 But this broader remit could also take the focus away from
addressing labour-related concerns. For instance, in the CARIFORUM−EU EPA,
where the civil society mechanism is competent to discuss all economic, social,
and environmental aspects of the whole agreement, labour standards issues have
never been discussed, in part because of the mechanism’s very wide remit.66
60 European Commission, p. 5, supra n. 4.
61 European Commission, p. 12, supra n. 4.
62 For instance, in Moldova, non-governmental organisations with capacity to engage in civil society
dialogue largely consist of think tanks, consultancy organizations, and public policy institutes. See Smith
et al. (2017), at 92, supra n. 27.
63 This is debatable. There is a standard article in recent EU trade agreements which commits the
parties to reviewing the sustainability impacts of the whole FTA. DAGs, as institutions created under
the FTA, appear to have a role in relation to this process. For instance Article 13.10 of the EU−South
Korea FTA states ‘The Parties commit to reviewing, monitoring and assessing the impact of the implemen-
tation of this Agreement on sustainable development, including the promotion of decent work, through
their respective participative processes and institutions, as well as those set up under this Agreement, for
instance through trade-related sustainability impact assessments.’
64 European Commission, p. 6, supra n. 4.
65 See our seventh critique above in section 3.
66Harrison et al., supra n. 14.
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Fourth, the European Commission proposes to ‘step up’ the resources available
for the implementation of the TSD chapter.67 The Commission has identiﬁed how
global Aid for Trade funding, and the G7’s Vision Zero Fund could be utilized to
develop projects to deliver on TSD chapter objectives. The Commission is already
making use of its own Partnership Instrument to fund projects connected to the
TSD chapters – the 3 million euro fund to better facilitate civil society activity
mentioned above, as well as a 9 million euro project on responsible supply
chains.68 Other development cooperation ﬁnancial mechanisms could also be
utilized in future such as the Development Cooperation Instrument, European
Instrument for Democracy andHumanRights, and the EuropeanDevelopment Fund.
These funds could be harnessed to develop further projects relating to the TSD
chapters. However, two issues should be addressed. First, a distinction should be
drawn between, on the one hand, developing projects which contribute to achiev-
ing the objectives of the TSD chapters (such as the supply chain project) and, on the
other hand, funding necessary to ensure a proper working of the institutions set up
by the TSD-chapters (such as the civil society activity project). Relying on ad hoc
projects funded by existing funding instruments appears insufﬁcient to address
the latter issue. For instance, given the current weakness, even absence, of monitor-
ing in relation to the effects of FTAs on sustainable development (see our point 7 in
section 3 above), a dedicated funding stream seems necessary to effectively support
monitoring activity in the future. The funds created for better facilitation of civil
society activity will certainly not be sufﬁcient to address this issue. The establish-
ment of funds that are speciﬁc to each agreement to fulﬁl the key objectives of
TSD chapters therefore appears important. Second, the effects of all projects devel-
oped in relation to TSD chapters need to be carefully assessed. It is unclear whether
current projects make a signiﬁcant contribution to the systematic implementation
of the TSD chapters. A careful evaluation needs to be conducted to assess results
of the projects that take place so as to better understand what can be achieved
through this project-based approach in the future.
Fifth, the Commission promises a ‘more assertive enforcement’ of obligations
under the TSD chapter, including increased monitoring of commitments, develop-
ment of action plans for trade partners where concerns are identiﬁed, and triggering
of dispute settlement processes where action plans are not followed.69 Then, if
expert panels make recommendations for action, follow up will be undertaken to
ensure recommendations are acted upon. The Commission has already started
using this more assertive approach with a number of its trade partners. Crucial
to demonstrating the effectiveness of its approach will be the ability of the
Commission to make signiﬁcant progress on more difﬁcult labour issues where
67 European Commission, p. 7, supra n. 4.
68 See EU, OECD, and ILO, Responsible Supply Chains in Asia, Action Fact Sheet, http://trade.ec.
europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/march/tradoc_156624.pdf (accessed 26 June 2018).
69 European Commission, supra n. 4, p. 3.
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trade partners are resistant to change. Otherwise, key stakeholders are likely to be
sceptical that more concerted use of existing instruments is a sufﬁcient step.70 The
EU model still appears to lack the concrete and tangible economic (dis)incentives to
action on labour standards, which have been identiﬁed as an important element of
being able to be assertive with trade partners.71
It is notable that the Commission rejected the alternative idea for reform as pre-
sented in the non-paper (second option), which focused on the idea of importing
stronger sanctions into the EU model by drawing on the example of the US as
well as the Canadian approach. As discussed earlier, the US approach can be differ-
entiated in a number of respects from that of the EU, including in terms of the sanc-
tions available and the fact that it has a more open system for receiving and
responding to complaints about the violation of labour provisions. Such com-
plaints have been raised by transnational alliances of trade unions and labour
NGOs in the US and its trading partners, and have led the US Department of
Labor to formally investigate disputes in seven countries to date, in some cases
resulting in government-level action plans.72 It is therefore important to note
that cases do not have to result in dispute settlement proceedings for action to
take place, and that the credible threat of legal action (and ultimately sanctions)
can lead to progress being made on labour issues in trade partners who would
otherwise be reluctant to engage.73 However, as with pre-ratiﬁcation conditional-
ity, the effects of these interventions should not be overstated. Agreed action plans
are not always followed.74 Moreover, the one case under a US FTA which has pro-
ceeded all the way to a decision by the dispute settlement panel found in favour of
the respondent. The case concerned trade union rights and other labour matters
pertaining to a variety of companies operating in Guatemala. The panel concluded
that the US had ‘proven that at eight worksites and with respect to 74 workers
Guatemala failed to effectively enforce its labor laws… but not that these instances
constitute a course of inaction that was in a manner affecting trade’.75 The
70 For instance, arguing for a model which includes stronger sanctions, see ‘ETUC Submission on the
Non-paper of the Commission Services on Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) Chapters in EU Free
Trade Agreements (FTAs)’, Brussels, 11 October 2017, https://www.etuc.org/en/document/etuc-submis-
sion-non-paper-commission-services-trade-and-sustainable-development-tsd (accessed 26 June 2018).
71Marx et al., p. 203, supra n. 27; Orbie and Van Den Putte, p. 39, supra n. 27. See also Ebert (2017),
pp. 310−311, supra n. 27.
72 These are Bahrain, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and Peru. See
US Bureau of International Labor Affairs, Submissions under Labor Provisions of Free Trade Agreements
(no date), www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/our-work/trade/fta-submissions (accessed 9 October 2017).
73 For a discussion of the impact of the US approach in Peru and Colombia, see Van den Putte, The
European Union’s Trade Labour Linkage: Beyond the ‘Soft’ Approach? (Ghent, Belgium: Faculty of
Political and Social Sciences, Ghent University, 2016), pp. 102−106.
74 Vogt, supra n. 27; ILO, supra n. 19; Cheong and Ebert, supra n. 58.
75 In the Matter of Guatemala – Issues Relating to the Obligations Under Article 16.2.1(a) of the
CAFTA-DR Final Report of the Panel (14 June 2017), para. 594, https://www.trade.gov/industry/tas/
Guatemala%20%20%E2%80%93%20Obligations%20Under%20Article%2016-2-1(a)%20of%20the
%20CAFTA-DR%20%20June%2014%202017.pdf (accessed 26 June 2018).
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difﬁculty of meeting the standards of proof regarding this provision has led to
labour advocates querying whether this creates legal hurdles that are going to be
very difﬁcult to overcome in future cases.76 This case has already led to demands
from key US stakeholders for ‘beef[ed] up’ provisions for enforcing labour stan-
dards in future trade agreements.77
It is therefore questionable whether the US model should have ﬁgured so prom-
inently in discussions about reform to the EU enforcement process, reducing the
debate about economic (dis)incentives to a question of whether to use state-
based sanctions. There are important lessons to learn about both the strengths
and weaknesses of the US dispute settlement mechanism. But as identiﬁed in the
academic literature, there are a number of models for dispute settlement which
could have been drawn upon in considering options for reform, including the
investment court system, the National Contact Points of the OECD Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises, certain elements of the ILO supervisory machinery,
and complaint mechanisms pertaining to voluntary sustainability standards.78
These models (as well as the US experience) demonstrate the need to move beyond
a binary sanctions/non-sanctions debate and to consider a range of complex design
issues in making proposals for how a more effective enforcement process could func-
tion. These include: how (and by whom) a dispute is initiated; who the complaint
targets (corporations could be targeted as well as states); what types of labour-
related allegations could be the subject of a dispute; who investigates the allegations
that are made; who adjudicates on any complaints that come to dispute settlement;
the nature of the legal test for proving a violation has occurred; and what form of
sanctions or ﬁnes are available to those who are adjudicating.79
The opportunity for a more nuanced debate about the optimal design for a
dispute settlement process now appears to have been lost.80 What is crucial
76 AFL-CIO,Written Comments on How to Make NAFTAWork for Working People (12 June 2017),
https://aﬂcio.org/statements/written-comments-how-make-nafta-work-working-people (accessed 26 June
2018). On the relevant criteria established by the panel and the surrounding evidentiary problems, see
Tequila Brooks, ‘US−Guatemala Arbitration Panel Clariﬁes Effective Enforcement under Labor
Provisions of Free Trade Agreement’, International Labor Rights Case Law, 4(1) (2018): 45−51.
77 International Trade Daily Bulletin, Bloomberg Law (30 June 2017), https://news.law.fordham.edu/
wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Labor-Dispute-Article.pdf; AFL-CIO, supra n.76. See also Celeste Drake,US
Trade Policy Fails Workers (26 June 2017), https://aﬂcio.org/2017/6/26/us-trade-policy-fails-workers
(both accessed 9 October 2017).
78 See on this Marx et al., supra n. 19. See also J. Harrison, B. Richardson, L. Campling, A. Smith, and
M. Barbu, Taking Labour Rights Seriously in Post-Brexit UK Trade Agreements Protect, Promote,
Empower, CSGR Working Paper Series (2017), at p. 24, http://www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/media/geography/
docs/research/working-beyond-the-border/284-17.pdf (accessed 9 October 2017).
79 For innovative ideas, for instance on who initiates complaints, see P.-T. Stoll, H. Gött, and P. Abel,
Model Labour Chapter for EU Trade Agreements (2017), www.fes-asia.org/ﬁleadmin/user_upload/docu-
ments/2017-06-Model_Labour_Chapter_DRAFT.pdf (accessed 9 October 2017).
80 It is still possible to consider complaints mechanisms, such as that proposed by Client Earth, which
can be instituted without reform of TSD chapters. See Client Earth, A Formal Complaint Procedure for a
More Assertive Approach towards TSD Commitments (27 October 2017), https://www.documents.
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moving forward is that the Commission lives up to its commitment to ‘continu-
ously analyse the effectiveness of the implementation of the TSD chapters’ and to
examine whether further measures are necessary to ensure ‘full and effective imple-
mentation’.81 Previous processes of monitoring have not been adequately operatio-
nalized.82 This time must be different if key stakeholders are to retain faith in the
reform process. This will only be achieved if the Commission is able to demonstrate
the ultimate objective set out in the second non-paper: ‘real and lasting change on
the ground, through the effective application of enhanced social and environmental
standards’.83
5. Going beyond the European Commission’s vision of reform
There are therefore ways in which the European Commission’s proposals could be
built upon to create meaningful reform of the current TSD chapters. But to maxi-
mize the opportunities for EU trade agreements to positively impact upon working
conditions and rights at work ‘on the ground’ we must go beyond the reform ideas
that the European Commission has put forward. What is needed is to think
imaginatively about how the various legal obligations and institutional mechan-
isms created by trade agreements can best be harnessed to further a labour
standards agenda. Two aspects of this broader vision are set out below.
First, it is critically important to consider the impact of the obligations in the rest
of the trade agreement on labour standards.84 Some provisions may have negative
effects. As identiﬁed above, it is important to operationalize existing provisions on
monitoring the employment and broader social impacts of the agreements as well as
to ensure that any adverse effects identiﬁed through the monitoring process are
effectively addressed. At the same time, there are limits to what even a fully oper-
ationalized monitoring process can achieve in terms of identifying problems created
by the trade agreement for labour standards, and consideration should be given to
the exclusion or restriction of provisions that put labour standards at risk.85 For
instance, careful attention should be paid to investment protection provisions
which allow international arbitrators – who may lack knowledge and understand-
ing of labour issues – to make decisions on the basis of investment law obligations,
which could have serious direct and indirect impacts on labour standards.86
clientearth.org/wp-content/uploads/library/2017-10-27-a-formal-complaint-procedure-for-a-more-assert-
ive-approach-towards-tsd-commitments-version-1.1-ce-en.pdf (accessed on 23 March 2018).
81 European Commission, supra n. 4 p. 3.
82 See our seventh critique above in section 3.
83 European Commission, supra n. 4, p. 1.
84 This is a point also made by the European Trade Union Confederation in their response to the
European Commission’s non-paper. See ‘ETUC Submission’, supra n. 70.
85 See Ebert (2017), supra n. 27.
86 See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2015, Chapter IV.
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Other provisions, if included, could have positive effects. In this respect, a range
of obligations in trade agreements and trade-related policies could be utilized to
create strong (dis)incentives for action. For instance, this could include more
relaxed rules of origin on strategic product lines for companies that demonstrate
they have enhanced labour standards protection of particular types;87 competition
rules which specify that abuses of labour standards could be considered as illegal
subsidies that would be potentially actionable; a negative list of prohibited
labour abuses, perhaps using ILO reporting measures as a trigger, which could
be assessed as ‘conferring a beneﬁt’ in terms of Article 14(a) of the Agreement
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures; and provisions which specify that
export credit licenses and other forms of support will only be granted to companies
if they demonstrate compliance with certain labour standards.88 These ideas are
presented to make clear that future action to make trade agreements actively
work in the interests of improving working conditions and rights at work need
not be restricted only to the TSD chapters of EU FTAs. Clearly, they need to be
carefully explored to ensure that such measures do not lead to disguised protection-
ism and that they are enacted in a way that respects other legal obligations (e.g. in
relation to World Trade Organization Agreements). More fundamentally, they
must have a positive impact on workers’ lives and the working population as a
whole. It is arguable that one of the explanations for why labour provisions have
not been very well implemented and enforced in the past is that trade ofﬁcials
may perceive such provisions as impairing the competitiveness of export industries.
What this points to is the need to conduct empirically grounded research on the
economic effects of labour provisions in FTAs where they have been linked to
improved working rights and at the same time have avoided negative economic
effects.89
87 An example of the EU already using relaxed rules of origin for social purposes, albeit with limited
effects so far, is the scheme for Jordanian exporters employing a minimum share of Syrian refugees. See
Heliodoro Temprano Arroyo, ‘Encouraging the Employment of Refugees through Trade Preferences’,
Policy Brief of the Immigration Policy Centre, Issue 2017/35 December 2017, http://cadmus.eui.eu/bit-
stream/handle/1814/49584/PB_2017_35_MPC.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (accessed 26 June 2018).
Given that rules of origin (RoO) are designed to support industries in FTA partner countries by blocking
third countries from beneﬁtting from a tariff advantage through simple transhipment, there is the risk that
liberalized RoOwould result in reduced jobs through trade diversion. However, in practice, RoO can often
be highly restrictive, limiting the availability of raw materials or intermediate products available to domes-
tic export-oriented processors, thereby undermining potential employment; as has been well documented in
relation to EU preferential RoO on clothing and ﬁsh products from the African, Caribbean, and Paciﬁc
group. See for example, L. Campling, ’Trade Politics and the Global Production of Canned Tuna’,
Marine Policy, 69 (July 2016): 220−228.
88Harrison et al., supra n. 78.
89 See e.g. G. Berik and Y. Rodgers. ‘Options for enforcing labour standards: Lessons from Bangladesh
and Cambodia’, Journal of International Development, 22(1) (2010): 56−85, which reports on the US’
‘trade-based labour standards program in Cambodia that appears to have helped boost employment con-
ditions without jeopardising export growth’− see p. 57. The authors emphasize the need in such schemes to
combine labour-related trade measures with strong independent monitoring and domestic policies that
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Second, there is also a need to think seriously about the kind of labour issues the
EU’s approach seeks to tackle (see discussion at the end of section 1) and the
mechanisms most appropriate for tackling those issues. For instance, if TSD chap-
ters do aim to have an impact on global supply chains, then proponents need to
address the supply chain dynamics affecting, among other things, prices paid and
delivery times expected, which structure the kinds of working conditions and
rights at work that employers are able to provide. How can trade agreements be
utilized to tackle the labour abuses arising from these inter-ﬁrm power relations?
Answers will involve moving beyond commitments to support corporate social
responsibility and efforts at sharing best practice in the sector. One mechanism
would be to ‘establish roadmaps for action in key export sectors with clear moni-
toring processes aimed at enhancing working conditions relevant to those economic
sectors’, which would include closer scrutiny on the activities of EU-based ﬁrms
co-ordinating such supply chains.90 A second mechanism would be to engage
further with voluntary sustainability standards or other certiﬁcation initiatives
which aim to foster compliance with the ILO conventions at the level of the produ-
cer and their supply chain.91 This would build on commitments already included in
EU trade agreements.92 As yet, little concrete action has been taken to promote
these voluntary instruments through TSD chapters.
Also key to effective implementation of labour provisions in leading export
sectors is a widening of the scope of the provisions themselves. Research on
global value chains and labour standards has shown that a focus on ILO core
labour standards is important but insufﬁcient to enhance working conditions in
promote productivity and fairness, and argue that this ‘increases the chances that the trade-linked strategy
would work to improve labour standards while minimising risks to employment and export growth’− see
p. 81.
90 The quote is taken from A. Smith, L. Campling, M. Barbu, J. Harrison, and B. Richardson, Do
Labour Provisions in EU Trade Agreements Improve Workers’ Lives and Working Conditions around
the World? (2017), p.6, www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/media/geography/docs/research/working-beyond-the-
border/Summary-ﬁndings.pdf (accessed 9 October 2017). For more detailed analysis of the underlying
issues see Smith et al. (2017), supra n. 27.
91 For a discussion, see A. Marx, N. Brando, and B. Lein (2017), ‘Strengthening Labour Rights
Provisions in Bilateral Trade Agreements. The Case of Voluntary Sustainability Standards’, Global
Policy, 8(3) (2017): 78−88.
92One can ﬁnd in almost any agreement signed after 2011 references to the importance of voluntary
mechanisms to achieve the objectives of the agreement. For example, Article 271 in the EU−Colombia/Peru
mentions that ‘The Parties recognise that ﬂexible, voluntary, and incentive-based mechanisms can contrib-
ute to coherence between trade practices and the objectives of sustainable development. In this regard, and
in accordance with its respective laws and policies, each Party will encourage the development and use of
such mechanisms.’Or Article 273c in the same agreement refers to the use of voluntary sustainability stan-
dards speciﬁcally in the forest sector. Another example is Article 9d in the EU−Vietnam agreement stipu-
lates that ‘The Parties recognize that voluntary initiatives can contribute to the achievement and
maintenance of high levels of environmental and labour protection and complement domestic regulatory
measures. Therefore, each Party, in accordance with its laws or policies, shall encourage the development
of and participation in such initiatives, including voluntary sustainable assurance schemes such as fair and
ethical trade schemes and eco-labels.’
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many sectors. Recourse should be also made to a broader set of labour standards −
including living wage provisions, occupational health and safety,93 and hours of
work; as well as migrant workers’ rights – and give particular attention to key
problems such as protecting workers in the informal economy, including through
social protection instruments.94
Overall then, the European Commission’s current reform agenda has been
constrained by focusing on how the TSD chapters and US equivalents currently
operate, and identifying incremental improvements. Rather we should think
about the key labour problems that should be prioritized and how the legal obliga-
tions and institutional mechanisms within EU trade agreements can be utilized to
address them.
6. Conclusion
In its ‘Trade for All’ strategy the European Commission has positioned itself as a
leader in promoting a ‘values-based’ model of free trade, which promotes labour
standards and sustainable development as it integrates economies. To deliver on
this promise and convince the growing chorus of critics that a ‘social dimension
of globalisation’ can be advanced, an effective trade–labour linkage is crucial.
Labour standards provisions in TSD chapters are central to the European
Commission achieving this objective. We have identiﬁed numerous studies examin-
ing the functioning of those chapters which have found serious limitations and fail-
ings with the current model. The fact that the European Commission has responded
to criticism and has created a set of proposals to ‘revamp’ TSD chapters is therefore
to be welcomed. The proposals do address a number of the limitations and failings
we identify. But we have also set out important further steps for the proper imple-
mentation of these proposals as well as limitations in the way some of the proposed
actions are currently conceived. Moving forward, there needs to be careful scrutiny
of the way in which the reform agenda is operationalized to ensure it leads to real
effects ‘on the ground’. At the same time, opportunities for maximizing the poten-
tial for trade agreements to really support better working conditions and rights at
work across the globe have not been taken. There remains an opportunity to be
more imaginative in terms of harnessing the mechanisms available within the
wider trade agreement to achieve those loftier objectives.
93 For an example of rather detailed provisions on occupational safety and health, see Article 23.3(3)
of CETA, which expressly refers to the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization of 2008.
94 Creating a framework for dealing with this broader set of labour issues, see the CLS+ model pro-
posed by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in e.g. ‘What is CLS Plus?’ (2016), www.fes-asia.org/ﬁleadmin/
user_upload/documents/FES-CLS.pdf (accessed 26 June 2018). Many of the relevant standards are
already contained within ILO Conventions.
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